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I. INTRODUCTION
In July, 2010, a federal court in Massachusetts held
unconstitutional the provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) that denies all federal benefits to same-sex spouses. The ruling
relied on two arguments: that the law interfered with the rights of states
guaranteed in the 10th Amendment, and that it violated the Constitution’s
equal protection clause. The first of these arguments doesn’t make much
sense, but the second, which had also persuaded two Ninth Circuit judges,
is so strong that it has a good chance of being accepted by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The equal protection claim is that DOMA lacks a rational basis
because it reflects a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group. The
argument has real bite, and it bites much harder now than it did in 1996,
when DOMA was passed by overwhelming margins in both houses of
Congress.1 President Bill Clinton felt that he had no alternative but to
2
hold his nose and sign the bill. As this is written, another Democratic
3
President, Barack Obama, has openly called for its repeal.
This growing success is a window into the hidden cultural roots of
law. It reveals the normative premises of rational basis analysis, at least
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern
University. Thanks to Martha Nussbaum and to audiences at the Symposium on DOMA
Issues Concerning Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships,
California Western School of Law, and at the Drake Constitutional Law Center 2010
Symposium for helpful discussion, and to Marcia Lehr for research assistance.
1
The bill passed the House by a vote of 342–67 on July 12, 1996. 142 CONG. REC.
H7505–06 (daily ed. July 12, 1996). It passed the Senate by a vote of 85–14 on
September 10, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. 22466–67 (1996).
2
The President signed the bill at 12:50 a.m. on September 21, 1996. Peter Baker,
President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at
A21.
3
See Scott Wilson, Obama Makes Explicit His Objection to DOMA, WASH. POST, Aug.
17, 2009,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/08/17/obama_makes_explicit_his_objec.html.
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whenever that analysis is used to invalidate a statute. The country’s
attitudes toward gay people have evolved rapidly, to the point where this
kind of lashing out at gays looks a lot less attractive than it did only a
decade ago. In 1996, otherwise reasonable people thought it a pointless
waste of taxpayer dollars to look after the basic needs of gay couples and
their families. This attitude was so pervasive that I myself was reluctantly
convinced that the part of the statute denying federal benefits would
survive rational basis challenge. That callousness no longer looks so
rational, and increasing numbers are ready to recognize gay relationships.
The burden of proof now lies on those who want to defend this
discrimination. It has become increasingly difficult to articulate a sensible
basis for this discrimination. The shift is really one of normative
priorities. The invocation of “rationality” masks the processes that are
actually at work.
This shift has implications for the choice of law problem, the
question of what happens when same-sex marriages cross state lines.
Choice of law analysis depends on the balancing of the legitimate interests
of different states in applying their own laws to a given transaction. The
interest balancing exercise obviously will come out differently if some
interests disappear from view. As the arguments against same-sex
marriage become increasingly antiquated, the choice of law problem will
gradually – I emphasize gradually - disappear.
Part I of this Article explores the doubts that have been expressed
about DOMA’s constitutionality, and elucidates its basis. Part II examines
DOMA’s origins and meanings, and reviews a plausible argument for its
constitutionality – an argument that once worried me, much more than it
does now. Part III examines the changing cultural context within which
legal analysis takes place. Part IV shows how constitutional law is
dependent on its cultural context. Part V examines a neglected argument
for the unconstitutionality of DOMA: the fact that the statute overtly
discriminates on the basis of sex. The conclusion considers the
implications of the analysis for choice of law.
II. THE NEW DOUBTS ABOUT DOMA
Section 3 of DOMA requires that marriage, for all federal
purposes, must be defined as the union of one man and one woman. It
was challenged by the Attorney General in Massachusetts, where samesex marriage is legal, and also in a separate suit, by Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) on behalf of seven married same-sex
couples and three widowers in the state who had been in same-sex

2

marriages. The plaintiffs included the surviving spouse of Rep. Gerry
Studds (D-Mass.),. After Studds’ death, his spouse was denied both health
insurance and the normal survivor annuity – the only widower of a
member of Congress to be refused these benefits. One of the plaintiffs in
the GLAD lawsuit is a police officer whose family would receive no
benefits, including the education benefit for surviving spouses, if she were
killed in the line of duty.4 The surviving spouse of Representative Gerry
Studds, the first openly gay man to serve in Congress, was denied both
health insurance and the normal survivor annuity—the only widower of a
member of Congress to be refused these benefits. 5 Several are retired and
do not have the Social Security benefits they would have received if their
6
spouse were of the opposite sex.
In the case brought by Massachusetts, District Judge Joseph Tauro
held that DOMA intrudes on “traditional government functions,”
specifically the state’s right to define what marriage is.7 In the
individuals’ cases, it held that there is no rational basis for denying federal
benefits to same sex spouses in marriages legally recognized in their
states.8 The first of these arguments is silly, and potentially mischievous.
But the second is very strong, and can and should carry the day if, as is
likely, the case is appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.
The trouble with the states’ rights argument is its implication that
whenever a federal law uses the word “marriage” to define the scope of
some federal program, it is obligated to follow state law. But an obvious
counterexample exists: immigration. In most states, the government
doesn’t involve itself in the reasons a couple marries, even if there’s no
love involved and the marriage is primarily a business transaction or a
matter of convenience. But when people marry for immigration purposes,
the federal government has no trouble deeming the marriage “fraudulent,”
even though it remains valid under state law. The Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agency doesn’t interfere with traditional state
functions, because it leaves the state free to recognize, for its own

4 Complaint app. at 6, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 1:09-cv-10309 (D. Mass. July
31, 2009), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-complaint-03-0309.pdf.
5 Id. at 27-34.
6
Id. at 69–70.
7 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum. Svcs., 2010 WL 2695668.
8 Id.
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purposes, any marriage it likes. But it won’t grant legal residency to
immigrants it believes married only to secure the benefit.
The other part of the court’s ruling, however, held that DOMA
lacked a rational basis, because none of the government’s justifications for
the law’s blanket discrimination made sense. This same argument had
previously persuaded two Ninth Circuit judges.
More than a year earlier, in January and February 2009, Judges
Alex Kozinski and Stephen Reinhardt, each acting in their capacity as
administrators of the courts, declared that DOMA does not preclude the
extension of federal insurance benefits to the same-sex spouses of court
employees. Kozinski avoided the constitutional issue—which he thought
was a serious problem—by construing DOMA not to preclude the
extension of benefits.9 Reinhardt thought that DOMA does block such
benefits, and concluded that it was therefore unconstitutional.10 Until
then, no federal judge had questioned the constitutionality of DOMA.11
Decisions by two such respected judges, widely separated on the political
spectrum—Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, is a Reagan appointee who
often speaks to the Federalist society, and Judge Reinhardt has been called
the most liberal judge on the liberal Ninth Circuit—had powerful
persuasive authority.
What is the basis of this doubt about the statute’s constitutionality?
Start with some basic constitutional law. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides in pertinent part that no state may “deny to any person . . . the
equal protection of the laws.”12 On this basis, the Court has struck down
9

See In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2009); see also In re Golinski, 587 F.3d
956, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2009) (awarding Golinski relief under the Back Pay Act, entitling
her to damages equal to the amount of benefits she would have received).
10
See In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009); see also In re Levenson,
587 F.3d 925, 934–38 (9th Cir. 2009) (awarding Levenson monetary relief under the
Back Pay Act). As this is written, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is
resisting the judges’ orders and disputing their authority to make them. See Joe
Davidson, OPM Defies Order on Same-Sex Benefits, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2009, at A17,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/21/AR2009122103240.html.
11
There were a few earlier cases in which DOMA’s constitutionality was challenged, but
they were uniformly unsuccessful. Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683–86
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 959 (2006); Matthews v. Gonzales, 171 Fed.
Appx. 120, 122 (9th Cir. 2006); Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp.
2d 1239, 1251–53 (N.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d in part, 333 Fed. Appx. 361 (10th Cir. 2009);
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305–09 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R.
123, 130–48 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
12
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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laws that impose certain inequalities, such as the race discrimination that
was challenged in Brown v. Board of Education.13 But it does not make
sense to condemn all inequalities imposed by the law. All laws classify—
and in that way make some citizens unequal to others. A law that forbids
10-year-olds from driving or voting treats them unequally from those who
are permitted to do these things. For this reason, with respect to laws that
do not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or a few other “suspect
classifications,” the constitutional test is what is called rational basis
review: the law will be upheld in court if it is “rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”14
In a few “rare and exceptional cases,” however, the Court has used
the rational basis test to strike down laws. 15 In these cases, the Court
deploys what scholars have called “rational basis with bite,” to distinguish
it from the toothless test that is ordinarily applied. 16 It is this line of
cases that the two Ninth Circuit judges were relying upon.
It is not always clear what the basis is for this greater severity of
scrutiny. One line of decisions offers an explanation. These are the cases
that hold that a law is unconstitutional if it reflects a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group. The first of these is USDA v. Moreno.17 It
invalidated a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act that excluded from
participation in the food stamp program any member of a household
whose members are not all related to each other.18 Congress, the
legislative history showed, was attempting to prevent “hippie communes”
from receiving any stamps.19 The Court held that this purpose was fatal
to the statute: “[I]f the constitutional concept of ‘equal protection of the
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”20 The law in Moreno had
13

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954).
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
15
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 689 (3d ed.
2006).
16
See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–24 (1972);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 680 (citing Jeffrey Shaman, Cracks in the Structure:
The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984)).
17
USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
18
Id. at 529.
19
Id. at 534.
20
Id.
14
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no purpose other than to keep federal benefits out of the hands of a group
Congress did not like.
Moreno became relevant to the gay rights question in Romer v.
Evans, which struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution—
referred to on the ballot as “Amendment 2”—declaring that neither the
state nor any of its subdivisions could prohibit discrimination on the basis
of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.” 2122 The Amendment, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
Court observed, “has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group.”23 The Amendment
seemed to “deprive[] gays and lesbians even of the protection of general
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental
and private settings.”24 The Court concluded that “Amendment 2
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else.”25 Quoting Moreno, it found that the
broad disability imposed on a targeted group
raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. “[I]f the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”26
Romer’s holding may thus be summarized:
[I]f a law targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon
it disabilities that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no
discernible relationship to any legitimate governmental interest,
then the Court will infer that the law’s purpose is simply to harm
that group, and so will invalidate the law.27

21

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 345–36 (1996).
Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
23
Id. at 632.
24
Id. at 630.
25
Id. at 635.
26
Id. at 634 (quoting USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
27
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW 8 (2002); see generally Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent,
6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89 (1997).
22
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All three judges relied on this line of cases to hold that DOMA is
unconstitutionally irrational if it denies benefits to married same-sex
couples.28
Judge Tauro observed that the House report on DOMA identified
four interests that the statute advanced: “(1) encouraging responsible
procreation and child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution
of traditional heterosexual marriage, (3) defending traditional notions of
morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources.”29 The first bore no
rational relationship to DOMA: children raised by same-sex couples tend
to turn out just as well as those raised by heterosexuals, and in any case,
denying benefits to same-sex couples is no help to heterosexual parents.
Nor can it encourage heterosexual marriage, because “this court cannot
discern a means by which the federal government's denial of benefits to
same-sex spouses might encourage homosexual people to marry members
of the opposite sex.” After Lawrence, morality is not a sufficient basis for
a law.30 Finally, “a concern for the preservation of resources standing
alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those
resources.” 31 Other justifications proffered by the Justice Department in
the litigation were equally unavailing. There was no valid federal interest
28

In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1149–51 (9th Cir. 2009).
29 Gill v. OPM, 2010 WL 2695652.
30 This is an overreading of Lawrence, which does not stand for such a broad
proposition. The better response to this interest was offered by Judge Reinhardt:
targeting same-sex couples for deprivation of benefits is “far too attenuated” a means to
the desired end, and “exhibits the ‘bare desire to harm’ same-sex couples that is
prohibited.” In re Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1150.
31 This argument was relied on heavily by supporters of the measure, though they relied
on delusional estimates of the cost. Senator Phil Gramm warned that the “failure to pass
this bill . . . will create . . . a whole group of new beneficiaries—no one knows what the
number would be—tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, potentially more—who
will be beneficiaries of newly-created survivor benefits under Social Security, Federal
retirement plans, and military retirement plans.” 142 CONG. REC. 22443 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Gramm). Senator Robert Byrd said that he did “not think . . . that it is
inconceivable that the costs associated with such a change could amount to hundreds of
millions of dollars, if not billions -- if not billions -- of Federal taxpayer dollars.” 142
CONG. REC. 22448 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
As it turns out, the fiscal consideration cuts the other way: federal recognition
of same-sex marriage would produce a modest increase in federal revenue, amounting to
a bit less than $400 million annually. See Letter and Report from Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, House Committee on the Judiciary 2 (June 21, 2004), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06-21-SameSexMarriage.pdf.
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in a uniform national definition of marriage, or in preserving the status
quo of nonrecognition of same-sex relationships.
The court followed an earlier Eleventh Circuit concurrence in
interpreting Romer to hold that “And “when the proffered rationales for a
law are clearly and manifestly implausible, a reviewing court may infer
that animus is the only explicable basis. [Because] animus alone cannot
constitute a legitimate government interest,”32 the court found that
DOMA lacks a rational basis. Judge Reinhardt’s opinion followed
essentially the same reasoning.
Kozinski avoided the constitutional issue by construing the
statute’s restriction of benefits to opposite-sex couples to merely dictate
minimum requirements for medical plans:
Under this broader construction, OPM would also be free to
contract for “family” benefits for individuals who do not qualify as
spouses under federal law, but who are considered spouses under
state law.
Adopting the broader construction of the statute . . . avoids
difficult constitutional issues. If I were to interpret the [statute] as
excluding same-sex spouses, I would first have to decide whether
such an exclusion furthers a legitimate governmental end. Because
mere moral disapproval of homosexual conduct isn’t such an end,
the answer to this question is at least doubtful.33
This difficult problem indicated that the statute did not bar the benefits.
“When a statute admits two constructions, one of which requires a
decision on a hard question of constitutional law, it has long been our
practice to prefer the alternative.”34
The analogy to the earlier cases makes sense. DOMA cuts off
federal benefits to a targeted, politically unpopular group, just like the law
in Moreno, and it does so in a remarkably broad and undifferentiated way,
just like the law in Romer. Some of the government’s rationales for the
law that were stated in the House Committee Report—“defending
traditional notions of morality, and preserving scarce government
resources”35—were presented and rejected in Moreno and Romer.
32 Quoting Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1280
(11th Cir.2004) (Birch, J., specially concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
(interpreting the mandate of Romer v. Evans).
33
In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2009).
34
Id. at 904 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–46 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
35
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2914.
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This line of cases displays the implicit normative premises of
rational basis analysis. Moreno and Romer invalidated laws for lacking a
rational basis, but any statute’s terms suggest a purpose that the statute
rationally serves.36 A law that bans the driving of blue Volkswagens on
Tuesdays is rationally—indeed, perfectly—related to the purpose of
preventing blue Volkswagens from being driven on Tuesdays. The real
issue is whether some goals are impermissible or not worth pursuing, a
question that cannot be answered on the basis of “rationality.” It depends
on your background assumptions about what ends are sensible or
37
legitimate to pursue.
What has done the work here is a shift in the culture, so that
treatment of gay people that seemed reasonable in 1996 no longer seems
so in 2009. It also helps that there are specific stories, some of which
were recounted earlier in this Article,38 of real people who are hurt by
DOMA. A policy that might seem sane when stated in the abstract looks
pretty stupid when applied to actual people.
III. THE PROVENANCE, EFFECT, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DOMA
A. The Origins of DOMA
The story of how DOMA was enacted has been told before, but it
is relevant here, so I will review it. 39
Gay rights advocates were as surprised as everyone else when a
1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision seemed to indicate that the state
would shortly have to recognize same-sex marriages.40 The court held that
the statute discriminated on the basis of sex, and therefore was subject to

36

See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and
Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1056–57 (1979); Robert Nagel, Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 124 (1972);
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 345–47 (1949).
37
Bennett, supra note 34, at 1078.
38 See supra note __.
39
See Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages
Cross State Lines 7–10, 114-36 (2006) [hereinafter Same Sex, Different States].
40
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
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strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the state constitution.41
In order to justify its discrimination against same-sex couples, the court
held, the state would have to show that the discrimination is necessary for
a compelling state interest.42 This is a nearly impossible burden to carry,
so most observers expected that the state would lose at trial—as in fact it
eventually did.43
DOMA was a reaction to the Hawaii case. It declared that no
same-sex marriage would be recognized for federal purposes, such as
filing joint tax returns, the award of social security survivor’s benefits, or
medical insurance for the families of federal employees.44 The Act also
indicated (here basically restating existing law, though with some
important and unnoticed modifications) that states were not required to
recognize marriages from other states when they had strong public policies
to the contrary. States also began enacting their own mini-DOMAs,
declaring that they did indeed have public policies against recognizing
same-sex marriages valid in other states.45
As it turned out, Hawaii never recognized same-sex marriage.
While Baehr v. Miike was still being appealed, a state constitutional
amendment was adopted, giving the legislature the right to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.46
Other states, however, soon moved toward recognition of same-sex
couples. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court declared that gay couples
were entitled under the state constitution to the same legal rights as
married heterosexual couples.47 The state constitution’s “common
benefits” clause, which required that government benefits be shared
equally by the entire community, required that gay people not be excluded
from legal benefits and protections available to heterosexuals.48 The

41

Id. at 67.
Id.
43
See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996) (holding that the state had not succeeded in showing a compelling interest at trial).
44 See infra text accompanying notes __-__.
45 See SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 37, at 137–48 (describing specific
provisions of these statutes)
46
See HAW. CONST., art. 1, § 23 (adopted 1998).
47
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
48
Id.
42
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legislature soon responded by enacting a law creating the status of “civil
unions,” with all the rights of marriage but not the name.49
Same-sex marriage—with the name included—arrived when the
Massachusetts Supreme Court decided in November 2003 that the state
constitution was violated by the denial of marriage licenses to gay couples.
The court held that there was no rational basis for this discrimination and
gave the state six months to comply with its order.50 It later explained, in
response to an inquiry from the legislature, that civil unions were
inadequate because they “would have the effect of maintaining and
fostering a stigma of exclusion that the Constitution prohibits.”51
Massachusetts started issuing the licenses on May 17, 2004.52
Other states have followed. Four states and the District of Columbia have
same-sex marriage, and five others have “civil unions” or “domestic
partnerships” with all the same rights and responsibilities. As this is
written, nearly a quarter of the population of the United States lives in a
jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex relationships as marriages or their
functional equivalent.53 By the end of 2008, approximately 32,000 same49

15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002 & Supp. 2009) (granting parties to a civil
union “all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they
derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source
of civil law, as are granted to a spouse in a marriage”).
50
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–70 (Mass. 2003).
51
In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004).
52
See Same-sex couples ready to make history in Massachusetts, CNN, May 17, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/mass.gay.marriage/index.html.
53
Based on U.S. Census population figures for 2009: United States, 307,006,550;
Massachusetts, 6,593,587; Connecticut, 3,518,288; Iowa, 3,007,856; New Hampshire,
1,324,575; Vermont, 621,760; District of Columbia, 599,657, California, 36,961,664;
Nevada, 2,643,085; New Jersey, 8,707,739; Oregon, 3,825,657; Washington, 6,664,195.
The first six of these call the relationships “marriage,” while the others use “domestic
partnerships” or “civil unions.” See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 (West 2004 & Supp.
2010) (domestic partnership); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010–.510 (2009) (domestic
partnership); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1–457-A:8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009)
(marriage); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1–26:8A-13 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009) (domestic
partners); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28–37:1-36 (West Supp. 2009) (civil union); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.990 n.6 (West Supp. 2009) (domestic partnership); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.60.10–.901 (West Supp. 2010) (domestic partnership); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2002 & Supp. 2009) (marriage); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (marriage); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862,
907 (Iowa 2009) (marriage); Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
1004–05 (Mass. 2003) (marriage). The eleven jurisdictions combined add up to
74,468,063, or 24.25% of the United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 POPULATION
ESTIMATES, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-
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sex couples had married in the United States, and 80,000 more were
54
domestic partners, reciprocal beneficiaries, or united in civil unions.
That creates a situation that did not exist immediately after DOMA’s
enactment: a population of actual married couples, whose rights are
adversely affected by the statute.
B. What DOMA Does
DOMA has two provisions. The provision that has received the
greatest amount of attention is the choice of law provision, which declares:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.55
Congress was afraid that, once same-sex marriages were recognized in
Hawaii, other states would be required to recognize them, too.
This provision displays all the sober good judgment of a
Congressional initiative to ward off vampires. The fears that prompted
Congress to act were based upon a massive misunderstanding of existing
law. States have always had the power to decline to recognize marriages
from other states, and they have been exercising that power for centuries.
The supporters of DOMA feared that recognition would be
required by the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States
Constitution. That clause provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.56

geo_id=01000US&-_box_head_nbr=GCT-T1&-ds_name=PEP_2009_EST&-lang=en&Format=US-40&-_sse=on.
54
GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX SPOUSES AND UNMARRIED
PARTNERS IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, 2008, at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/WilliamsInstitute/pdf/ACS2008FullReport.pdf.
55
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
56
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Congress thought by invoking the last part of the provision, it could avoid
the difficulty by prescribing that same-sex marriages need not have any
effect.
Full faith and credit, however, only applies to judgments—
decisions of courts after adversarial litigation. It has never been held to
apply to marriage. This provision of DOMA does have some effect, but
the actual effects are so capricious as to be unconstitutional. The statute
may have no constitutional applications. I have developed this argument
elsewhere and will not repeat it here.57
Although, when the bill was being debated, most of the press’s
attention focused on the choice of law provision of DOMA—sometimes
implying that it was the only substantive provision of the bill—the
definitional provision was and is far more important. It is the focus of
Tauro’s, Reinhardt’s, and Kozinski’s opinions. It provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage”
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.58
Given the broad range of federal laws to which marital status is
relevant, the consequences of DOMA are far-reaching. Same-sex spouses
may not file joint tax returns.59 Same-sex spouses’s debts incurred under
divorce decrees or separation agreements would be dischargeable in
bankruptcy.60 Same-sex spouses of federal employees are excluded from
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,61 the Federal Employees
Group Life Insurance program,62 and the Federal Employees
Compensation Act, which compensates the widow or widower of an
employee killed in the performance of duty.63 Same-sex spouses are the
only surviving widows and widowers who would not have automatic
ownership rights in a copyrighted work after the author’s death.64 Same57
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sex spouses lack federal protection against enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses, which allow a lender to declare the entire balance due and payable
if mortgaged property is transferred, and which could compel the loss of
the family home if the holder of the mortgage died and the spouse
inherited the property.65 Same-sex spouses are denied the benefit of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which provides for up to twelve
weeks per year of unpaid leave to employees for “care for a spouse.”66
Same-sex spouses are similarly unable to receive benefits under the Social
Security Act’s Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program.67
Same-sex spouses are denied preferential treatment under immigration law
and, therefore, are the only legally-married spouses of American citizens
who face deportation.68
C. The Constitutional Puzzle of the Definitional Provision
Is the definitional provision of DOMA constitutional? Congress
has the power to define the terms of the United States Code. The only
way to challenge this provision is to claim that it is impermissibly
discriminatory. All discrimination claims allege the abuse of a power that
the actor concededly possesses. Congress could not define “marriage” to
mean only a legal union between persons of the same race.69 But the
constitutional significance of discrimination against gays is uncertain. The
federal courts have been unwilling to give heightened scrutiny to laws that
target gays, and the Supreme Court has not directly confronted the
question.70 On one occasion, however, the Court did invalidate a law that
65

See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
67
See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)–(c).
68
See, e.g., Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2009, at A19; Editorial, Reunite This Family, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27,
2007, at A8.
69
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
70
A number of federal courts have reasoned that, because the Supreme Court held that a
law criminalizing homosexual sodomy does not violate the Due Process Clause; see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–96 (1986); it would be anomalous to deem gays
a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. This is a non sequitur. It implicitly
assumes that, if there is any provision of the Constitution that a law does not violate, the
law cannot violate any other constitutional command either. See Andrew Koppelman,
Gaze in the Military: A Response to Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC L. REV. 179, 187
(1995) (citing cases). These cases are ripe for revisiting, since Hardwick has been
overruled. See generally Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcising the Ghosts of Bowers v.
Hardwick: Uprooting Invalid Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519 (2009).
66

14

singled out gays for disadvantage. That is Romer, on which Tauro and
Reinhardt rely heavily.
DOMA’s definitional provision and the amendment invalidated in
Romer have telling similarities. Like the Colorado amendment, this
provision “identifies persons by a single trait [membership in a same-sex
71
marriage] and then denies them protection across the board.” Congress
does not seem to have given any specific consideration to the broad range
of federal policies to which spousal status is relevant, or to have made any
effort to justify the numerous specific disabilities that the statute imposed.
For the first time in American history, DOMA created a set of secondclass marriages, valid under state law but void for all federal purposes.
The exclusion of a class of valid state marriages from all federal
72
recognition is “unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”
A defender of the statute could reply, however, that the disability it
imposes, though broad, is proportionate to the situation that called it forth.
DOMA’s definitions of “marriage” and “spouse,” the House committee
report observed, “merely restate[] the current understanding of what those
terms mean for purposes of federal law.”73 When Congress used the term
“marriage” in the United States Code, it never imagined that this term
would include same-sex couples.74 Hawaii’s adoption of same-sex
marriage “would radically alter a basic premise upon which the
presumption of adoption [for federal purposes] of state domestic relations
law was based— namely, the essential fungibility of the concepts of
‘marriage’ from one state to another.”75 This provision of DOMA, then,
merely reaffirms “what is already known, what is already in place.”76 It is
hard to see how a law that simply declares the status quo can be
unconstitutionally discriminatory.
The Romer analogy does not necessarily devastate DOMA because
there are significant disanalogies as well. Unlike Amendment 2, this law
does not “outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be
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77

claimed for it.” Amendment 2’s license to discriminate against gays was
so broadly worded that it seemed to the Court likely to mandate some
unconstitutional applications.78 That fact bespoke a bare desire to harm
gays. However, there is no fundamental right to file a joint tax return or to
receive social security benefits. The discrimination against same-sex
couples may be unprecedented, a defender of DOMA could say, but so is
the situation that called forth the law. If there is any positive value to the
tradition of restricting marriage to one man and one woman, then this
positive value provides a rational basis for DOMA. One cannot
confidently infer, simply by considering the definitional provision on its
face, that its purpose is a desire to harm the group. That might be the
purpose, but an innocent explanation is available. The Court has often
been prone to credit innocent explanations of statutes, even those that
harm constitutionally-protected groups.79 In order for the law to be
invalidated, there has to be some reason to disbelieve that explanation.
The statute’s targeting of gays, and the uniqueness of the disability
imposed, provide some of the needed evidence of invidious purpose:
“[l]aws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status . .
80
. are rare,” and “‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to
the constitutional provision.’”81 But where is this “careful consideration”
to lead? Romer relied— how heavily?— on the fact that no innocent
explanation of the statute seemed even facially plausible.82 The Court’s
opinion does not indicate what should be done if the state is able to proffer
such an innocent explanation.
I once wrote, on the basis of the reasoning just stated, that “an
equal protection challenge to the definitional provision of DOMA,
83
standing alone, would be a hard case.” I recant, disavow what I wrote,
and repent. It is not such a hard case any more. I think GLAD has a
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pretty good chance of winning its suit. The culture has shifted, in ways
that I had not anticipated.
III. THE CHANGING CULTURAL CONTEXT
Gay rights claims of all kinds became more politically potent in the
1980s, largely as a consequence of the willingness of unprecedented
numbers of gay people to come out to their friends, families, and
coworkers. In 1985, only a quarter of Americans reported having a gay
friend, relative, or coworker.84 By 2000, that proportion had tripled, to
three-quarters of the population.85 Only a fifth said they did not know
anyone gay.86 The number who reported having a gay friend or close
acquaintance rose from twenty-two percent in 1985 to fifty-six percent by
2000.87 Those reporting a gay or lesbian family member rose from nine
percent in 1992 to twenty-three percent in 2000.88 Gay people were
increasingly visible, and their claims were the claims of familiar human
beings, not distant abstractions.
Pressure for recognition of same-sex relationships increased during
the 1980s, historian George Chauncey observes, because of the impact of
two new developments in that period: the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian
baby boom.89 AIDS victims often had to rely on the assistance of
partners who were regarded by the law as legal strangers to them.90
“Because they were not ‘next of kin,’ hospitals could refuse them the right
to visit their partners, did not need to consult with them or even inform
them about treatment, and could not designate them to sign forms
authorizing medical treatments even if they wanted to.”91 A surviving
partner sometimes lost his home when his partner’s biological family
contested his will or claimed a jointly-owned home or property.92 The
84
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willingness of some courts to set aside wills of gay testators sometimes led
partners to settle for a fraction of their inheritance.93
At the same time, increasing numbers of lesbian couples were
having children, typically through the use of donor sperm.94 They
worried about what would happen if the biological mother died and a
relative contested the right of the surviving partner to continue to have a
relationship with the child.95 Difficulties also arose when a couple
separated after one had given birth to a child who both had raised.96 The
nonbiological mother had no legal relationship with the child and no right
to visitation, and the biological mother had no claim for child support.97
As horror stories accumulated, “more couples hired lawyers to
prepare wills, medical powers of attorney, and other documents to provide
them with some security.”98 But a complete set of documents
approximating the protections of marriage could cost thousands of dollars,
more than many couples could afford.99 And, as noted earlier, some
benefits of marriage could not be achieved by any contract between the
parties.100 So gay couples began to campaign for some recognition of
their relationship under the rubric of “domestic partnerships.”101
Avoiding the term “marriage” made sense, since the experience of
unsuccessful litigation in the 1970s and 1980s had made it clear that samesex marriage was not, even distantly, on the political horizon.102
Then came Hawaii— and I have already told you the rest of that
story.103 Pressure for recognition has only increased since then.104
Public opinion is making marriage recognition inevitable.
According to Gallup, 57% of Americans oppose same-sex marriage.105
93
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There is a sharp generational divide, however. Opponents of same-sex
marriage have been spectacularly unsuccessful at passing their attitudes on
to their children. Among those 18 to 34 years old, 58% support same-sex
marriages.106 Support for same-sex marriage drops to 42% among
respondents 35 to 49 years old, to 41% of those 50 to 64 years old, and
only 24% of those aged 65 and older.107 The effect is even noticeable
among white evangelical Christians, otherwise a very conservative lot:
32% of 18 to 29 year old white evanglical Christians support some legal
recognition of same-sex couples, with an additional 26% supporting
marriage rights. 108 In other words, 58% of white young evangelical
Christians support at least some legal recognition of same-sex couples.109
Of white evangelical Christians 30 and older, 37% support some legal
recognition of same-sex couples, and an additional 9% support full samesex marriage rights—a total of only 46% of older white evangelical
Christians who support any legal recognition of same-sex couples.110
Older evangelicals also care much more about the issue: according to a
Pew Forum study, 61.8% of white evangelical Christians over age 60 said
that “stopping gay marriage” was very important, while only 34% of white
evangelical Christians 29 and younger said so.111 The case against same105
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sex marriage has become increasingly unintelligible.112 That obviously
will have implications when courts go looking for a rational basis for laws
that discriminate against gay people.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION LIVES!
All this affects the shape of constitutional law. What constrains
constitutional law is not a set of rules, but a set of rhetorical norms,
themselves unstable and shifting over time, that determine which moves
are legitimate. Richard Posner has observed that “‘thinking like a
lawyer’” really means “an awareness of approximately how plastic law is
at the frontiers—neither infinitely plastic . . . nor rigid and predetermined,
as many laypersons think.”113
Jack Balkin emphasizes the way in which the boundaries of
legitimate constitutional argument shift as culture does, so that an
argument regarded as crackpot and “off the wall” at one time becomes
accepted doctrine later on.114 Balkin also observes that, because
constitutional law is in some respects hostage to cultural shifts, social
movements, such as the Civil Rights movement or, more recently, the
movement for gun rights, can change the shape of constitutional law.
112
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In practice the meaning of constitutional principles shifts over
time. Some constitutional terms, such as “equal protection,” are
intentionally abstract, leaving the specification to be worked out by later
generations. Mobilized social movements, invoking their own
interpretations of those texts, play a legitimate role in determining which
specification will ultimately prevail.115 The constitutional protection of
sex equality, for example, is the consequence of the feminist movement of
the 1970s, which changed the mind of the public in a way that eventually
was reflected in the interpretation of the Constitution.116 The triumph of
gun rights in District of Columbia v. Heller117 is another example.118
The idea that social movements shape constitutional law has been
particularly distressing to many originalists, who are committed to the idea
that the Constitution’s meaning does not shift over time.119 John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport write, “it is a little difficult to see what
is left of a recognizable originalism, not to mention the amendment
process, if social movements have such substantial discretion to apply
constitutional provisions as they see fit.”120 Steven Calabresi and Livia
Fine claim that Balkin’s originalism “substitutes the rule of engaged social
movements for the rule of law.”121
These charges draw blood only if there is a feasible alternative to
the world contemplated by Balkin—an originalism that purges
adjudication of discretion and the vagaries of political change.
Balkin’s argument is both descriptive and normative. The
descriptive part is an account of how constitutional interpretation is done
in the United States—how constitutional interpreters in this culture make
their way from the spectacularly vague commands of “equal protection”
and “due process” to determinate legal outcomes. The normative part
pronounces this process good. Like so many liberal legal theorists in the
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age of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, Balkin is a stodgy defender of
the status quo.
Originalists are unhappy with the way that constitutional law
actually operates. They propose to scrap it, and replace it with a new and
untested theory. They are the real radicals. Their unhappiness with the
regime as it actually operates, and has operated throughout American
history, gives rise to a troubling and underexamined question: Why do
122
originalists hate America?
V. THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT LIVES, TOO
As our culture evolves, it may even become possible for courts to
notice the constitutional difficulty with DOMA that is hiding in plain
sight: the fact it makes one’s rights under federal law turn on one’s
gender.
This is exactly the situation that the Court faced in the earliest sex
discrimination cases. Frontiero v. Richardson invalidated a law that
automatically allowed male members of the Air Force to claim their wives
as a dependent and therefore receive housing and medical benefits, but
required female members to prove that their husbands depended on them
123
for more than half their support. If Sharron Frontiero had been male,
she would have gotten the benefits.124 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld struck
down a provision of the Social Security Act that allowed a widowed
mother, but not a widowed father, to receive survivor’s benefits based on
125
the earnings of the deceased spouse. If Stephen Wiesenfeld had been
female, he would have gotten the benefits he was denied.126
The GLAD lawsuit and the two Ninth Circuit cases present exactly
the same situation.127 In each case, had the spouse been of a different
sex, the benefits would automatically have been granted. For example,
Congressman Studds’s widower, Dean Hara, is disqualified for a federal
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pension because he is a man. If he were a woman, the problem would
disappear.
All discrimination against gays is a kind of sex discrimination. I
have stated and defended this argument many times before, and will not
128
repeat it all here. I will, however, respond to one criticism of my
argument recently made by Martha Nussbaum.
Nussbaum argues that it is true that “wherever a change of a male
to a female or a female to a male makes a decisive legal difference, that
law involves a classification based upon sex, and such classifications
129
deserve heightened scrutiny.” But she objects that this argument
“seems legalistic in the pejorative sense,” because “it doesn’t quite get at
what is really going on;” it “doesn’t reach deeply enough to get at the real
130
source of the discrimination.” Antigay discrimination is about sexual
orientation, not about sex.
My argument does not, however, purport to be a complete
explanation of where the discrimination is coming from. Rather, it claims
that sex discrimination is one of the many wrongs present in antigay
131
discrimination.
Nussbaum’s objection mistakes a complaint for an
explanation. I am not attempting to explain antigay discrimination. I am
complaining that certain laws violate a specific constitutional prohibition.
Another way of reading Nussbaum’s objection is that the sex
discrimination identifies a wrong, but not the most morally-salient wrong.
It is like saying that Al Capone, the notorious 1920s bootlegger who
ordered the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre, was guilty of tax evasion. This
is a strange way to characterize the totality of his misconduct. On the
other hand, if we are doing a legal rather than a moral analysis, the tax
128
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evasion charge is accurate: whatever else he is guilty of, he certainly is
guilty of that. (Tax evasion is what Capone was eventually convicted of.)
Similarly with the sex discrimination argument: whatever the other
constitutional difficulties with DOMA, it certainly discriminates on the
basis of sex.
I would also argue that my complaint is not “legalistic in the
pejorative sense,” because there are deep links—not fully explanatory
links, but nonetheless deep enough that this is not just a lawyer’s trick between sexism and heterosexism.
When I developed the sex discrimination argument in a 1994
article, I emphasized that the argument does not depend on any claim
132
about the connection between heterosexism and sexism.
I went on to
develop such a claim, however, because I recognized that judges might
wonder whether the protection of gays is consistent with the purposes of
sex discrimination doctrine.133 The answer depends on what one thinks
sex discrimination law is for. If the purpose is to prevent the imposition of
gender classifications on people’s life choices, then the argument is over;
this is just what the formal argument shows that antigay discrimination
134
If, however, one thinks that sex discrimination law exists in order
does.
to end the subordination of women, then one would have to demonstrate
some link between antigay discrimination and the subordination of
women. For this reason, I argued at some length that sexism is an
important wellspring of antigay animus, and that the homosexuality taboo
135
functions to strengthen gender hierarchy.
The point is not an esoteric one. Most Americans learn no later
than high school that one of the nastier sanctions that one will suffer if one
deviates from the behavior traditionally deemed appropriate for one’s sex is
the imputation of homosexuality. The two stigmas—sex-inappropriateness
and homosexuality—are virtually interchangeable, and each is readily used
as a metaphor for the other.
To the extent I am relying on an explanation of homophobia,
Nussbaum makes the mechanism sound too conscious when she describes
it as “a way of maintaining binary divisions of the sexes and the
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136

patriarchal control of men over women.” Rather, I am offering a story
about maintenance of gender identity—one that is not all that different
from the one about disgust toward markers of the mortal body that
Nussbaum tells.137 She argues, against the sex discrimination argument,
that prejudice against gay men draws centrally upon “profound anxieties
about bodily penetrability and vulnerability (anxieties that are felt, above
138
all, by men).” Is that not about maintaining gender hierarchy? Does
this anxiety not presuppose that there are certain people whose
penetrability, construed as subordination, is perfectly acceptable, and that
it is urgently important not to be one of those people?
The deeper problem, as a matter of law, with jumping straight to
the claim that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, as Nussbaum
wishes to do, is that most of the laws that hurt gay people do not classify
on the basis of sexual orientation. The law in Romer did, but it was an
outlier. Even the law in Lawrence v. Texas, which specifically
criminalized homosexual sex, did not require any state official formally to
treat gay people differently from heterosexuals.139 It just demanded to
know the gender of the participants in the sex act. Similarly with laws that
restrict marriage to heterosexual couples.140
The formalism here is not mine. It is intrinsic to the Supreme
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, which was well-suited to deal
with Jim Crow (which was full of formal race discriminations; the law
needed to know what race you were in order to decide whether you could
drink out of that fountain), but is less suited to deal with any law that
subordinates groups but does not formally classify by sex. Disparate
impact does not count unless it is motivated by a malicious desire to hurt
141
the affected group (which is very hard to prove). Given the law’s focus
on classification, which is not going away any time soon, we are probably
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going to need the sex discrimination argument even if courts accept that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification.
Courts have summarily rejected the sex discrimination argument,
frequently on the basis of the very sex stereotypes that sex discrimination
law aims to eradicate.142 Why does the logic of the sex discrimination
argument not prevail? To say it once more, the bounds of legitimate legal
argument are not set by rules, but by custom and usage. The sex
discrimination argument proves too much: if it is accepted, the acceptance
of same-sex marriage automatically follows, and courts resisted that
conclusion as politically impossible. Now that same-sex marriage is
thinkable, it may be possible to address the argument on its merits.

VI. CONCLUSION
The cultural shift I have been discussing also affects interest
analysis in choice of law. Choice of law today is dominated by what is
called “interest analysis,” which tries to balance the legitimate interests—
both territorial and personal—of different states in having their own laws
apply.143 In order to apply it in a case where it is not clear which state’s
marriage laws apply, one must determine what the legitimate state
interests are.
In my own analysis of choice of law and same-sex marriage, I have
had to stipulate for the sake of the argument what I do not really believe,
that states have a legitimate interest in denying same-sex couples the right
to marry.144 But those interests are likely to shrink. As Tobias Wolff has
145
pointed out, after Lawrence v. Texas, any purported interest in
146
excluding gay couples from a state’s borders is illegimate.
Lawrence
and Romer together indicate that expression of moral disapproval, without
more, is not a sufficient reason for denying equal treatment to same-sex
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couples.147 Saenz v. Roe indicates that a state may not structure its legal
entitlements for the specific purpose of dissuading people from migrating
to its borders.148
This leaves some, but not a great many, legitimate interests that
states can invoke. For all the reasons already canvassed, these are likely
to make less and less sense to judges. The time is coming when I will no
longer have to stick to my stipulation in order to be able to address the
choice of law issues presented by same-sex marriage.
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